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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the San Francisco Chronicle laid off 63-year-old
photographer Frederic Larson.1 Unemployed and with two children in
college, Larson managed to find a job teaching photojournalism at a
university but took a significant cut in salary and benefits.2 Needing to
earn more income, Larson resorted to the online marketplace.3 For 12 days
each month, Larson now rents out his home in Marin County, California,
through Airbnb4 for $100 per night.5 On the nights that Larson rents out
his home, he stays in a separate room and showers at his local gym.6 Four
nights each week, Larson turns his Prius into a de facto taxi and drives
strangers to their desired destinations through Lyft.7 He earns an average
of $100 per night.8 By sharing his home and his vehicle, Larson generates
about $3,000 of additional income each month.9
Coined as the “sharing economy,” a new economic culture is
revolutionizing the global marketplace and disrupting established
commercial industries.10 The sharing economy, through smartphone

1. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy,
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/
2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/ [https://perma
.cc/H7H2-A3NK].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See How It Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/gettingstarted/how-it-works [https://perma.cc/5WBP-9TYD] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
5. Geron, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Sydney Finkelstein, Will There Be a Revolt in the Sharing Economy?,
BBC (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20150325-revolt-in-thesharing-economy [https://perma.cc/D8PM-MVWM].
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applications (“apps”),11 enables millions of people like Frederic Larson to
earn income by capitalizing on free time and unused property.12 At the tap
of a finger, consumers can obtain notoriously expensive services, such as
car rides and vacation lodging, for affordable prices.13 The increasing
popularity of the sharing economy marks a shift in both workplace and
consumer values, and preference for freelance over full-time employment
and renting over owning property progressively rises each year.14 Scholars
contend that the United States is experiencing a groundbreaking
marketplace shift analogous to the Industrial Revolution.15 In addition to
introducing innovative economic opportunities, however, the sharing
economy raises serious liability issues.16
On March 15, 2018, for instance, Kevin and Amy Sharp, their twelveyear-old son Wayne, and their seven-year-old daughter Adrianna Marie
vacationed to Tulum, Mexico, and rented a condo through the home

11. Understanding Mobile Apps, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www
.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0018-understanding-mobile-apps [https://perma.cc/TE
A3-2RHM] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018). A smartphone application is a streamlined
internet platform that users can access on a mobile phone, tablet, or computer. Id.
12. Scott M. Prange, Managing the Workforce in the Gig Economy, HAW.
B.J. 4, 7 (2016).
13. Kurt Matzler et al., Adapting to the Sharing Economy, 56 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 71, 72 (Winter 2015). For example, Airbnb lists a studio apartment
located in Manhattan’s Upper East Side in New York City for $70 per night.
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/rooms/5247202?location=Manhattan%2C%20
New%20York%2C%20NY%2C%20USA&guests=1&adults=1 [https://perma.cc
/2H78-CS23] (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). Hotel listings in the same area generally
cost between $200 to $700 per night. HOTEL GUIDES, https://hotelguides.com/
new-york/manhattan-nyc-ny-upper-east-side-hotels.html [https://perma.cc/KX7
R-D5BR] (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
14. See Sara Horowitz, The Freelance Surge Is the Industrial Revolution of
Our Time, ATLANTIC (Sep. 1, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2011/09/the-freelance-surge-is-the-industrial-revolution-of-our-time/244
229/ [https://perma.cc/W65J-276S].
15. Jose Heftye & Robert Bauer, Insuring the Sharing Economy, AMERICAN
INT’L GROUP, INC. (2017), https://www.aig.com/content/dam/aig/america-canada
/us/documents/insights/aig-insuring-the-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W5QL-YAXV].
16. See Kate Samuelson, Faulty Water Heater to Blame for Deaths of Iowa
Family of Four in Mexico, Police Say, TIME (Apr. 6, 2018), http://time.com/52
30715/iowa-family-of-four-dead-mexico-water-heater/ [https://perma.cc/MT5Z5733].
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sharing platform VRBO17 for six days.18 The Sharp family never
returned.19 Family members reported the Sharps missing to the United
States Embassy in Mexico, and Mexican authorities found the entire
family dead in the condo several days later.20 Autopsy reports revealed that
the Sharp family died due to “asphyxiation by inhalation of toxic gases.”21
Investigators identified a rusted, faulty water heater located in the laundry
room of the condo as the cause of the toxic gas leak.22 Authorities believed
the family died in their sleep from inhaling toxic gas circulating in the
air.23
As demonstrated by the Sharp family’s tragedy, the sharing economy
poses a significant risk of harm, especially given the lack of oversight
sharing-economy companies exercise over their services.24 Jurisprudence
indicates that present tort law is inadequate in defining liability for
sharing-economy actors.25 Sharing-economy companies maintain
unprecedented, innovative business models that do not fit the mold of
traditional tort classifications for commercial entities, leaving courts
uncertain on the question of tort liability.26 Lawsuits can result in
jurisprudence that clarifies or provides the law, but the vast majority of
lawsuits against sharing-economy companies settle before the trial stage
of litigation.27 Tort liability in the sharing economy will, therefore, remain
17. About the Family, VRBO, https://www.vrbo.com/info/about-us/aboutthe-family [https://perma.cc/LAP4-6S7X] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
18. Bill Hutchinson, Bodies of American Family of 4 Killed by Gas Poisoning
in Mexico Coming Home for Funeral: Relatives, ABC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2018, 5:11
PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/bodies-american-family-killed-gas-poisoningmexico-coming/story?id=54001040 [https://perma.cc/6VA5-CT3K].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Samuelson, supra note 16.
23. Jason M. Volack, Tara Fowler, & Julia Jacobo, American Family Who
Died in Mexico ‘Went to Sleep and Never Woke Up,’ Cousin Says, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 23, 2018, 4:40 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/american-family-founddead-mexico/story?id=53967241 [https://perma.cc/2XC2-LGFK].
24. Samuelson, supra note 16.
25. See generally Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp.
3d 767, 769 (E.D. La. 2017); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782
(N.D. Cal. 2016).
26. See generally id.
27. Daniel Fisher, The Big Question with Uber, Airbnb and the Rest of the
‘Sharing Economy’: Who to Sue?, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2015, 7:24 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/03/25/the-big-question-with-uber-airbnband-the-rest-of-the-sharing-economy-who-to-sue/#140b8a71589d [https://perma.c
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uncertain until state legislatures pass or amend legislation to resolve the
ambiguity.28
To avoid litigation costs and the possibility of having to pay
considerable tort damages, some sharing-economy companies have
implemented insurance programs to compensate their agents and
consumers for harm sustained during use of a company’s services.29 The
insurance programs further the underlying tort principles of compensation
for harm and deterrence of tortious conduct.30 Both sharing-economy
agents and consumers timely receive definite compensation for damage to
their property and persons resulting from negligent acts.31 Decreasing the
amount of insurance claims filed, in turn, incentivizes sharing-economy
companies to ensure a higher degree of safety.32 Private insurance, albeit
effective, does not replace the need for a clear standard of liability under
tort law.33
Accordingly, state legislatures should pass legislation mandating that
all sharing-economy companies implement insurance programs to
compensate personal injury and property damage resulting from negligent
acts.34 For damage resulting from intentional acts, state legislatures should
impose a heightened standard of care for sharing-economy companies.35
This legislative, insurance-based solution will provide clarity and
predictability in sharing-economy litigation.
c/739F-YTJK]. A settlement is “a legally enforceable agreement in which a
claimant agrees not to seek recovery outside the agreement for specified injuries or
claims from some or all of the persons who might be liable for those injuries or
claims.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 24 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
28. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (AM. LAW
INST. 1979). State legislatures are charged with articulating the tort law for their
respective states. Id.
29. Fisher, supra note 27.
30. See generally Host Protection Insurance, AIRBNB, https://www.air
bnb.com/host-protection-insurance [https://perma.cc/N85R-3JA8] (last visited
Oct. 13, 2018); Auto Insurance to Help Protect You, UBER, https://www.uber
.com/drive/insurance/ [https://perma.cc/D5UY-58PH] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
31. See generally id.
32. See generally Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New
Sharing Economy, 49 CONN. L. REV. 171, 178 (2016).
33. Id.
34. See generally Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain:
Compensation for Work Injuries in the United States, 1900-2017, 69 RUTGERS
U.L. REV. 891, 920 (2017).
35. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 40(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
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Part I of this Comment discusses the sharing economy’s revolutionary
effect in the marketplace and introduces the complexity of sharingeconomy companies’ business models. Part II exposes the inadequacy of
traditional tort classifications to define liability in the sharing economy by
presenting the Carroll v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.
and Doe v. Uber Technologies opinions. Part III demonstrates the manner
in which Congress or state legislatures may enforce an insurance-based
solution and apply such a solution in the context of Carroll and Doe v.
Uber. Finally, this Comment concludes by explaining the advantages of a
legislative insurance-based solution to courts, sharing-economy
companies, agents, and consumers.
I. AMERICA’S SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE SHARING
REVOLUTION
The sharing economy is revolutionizing the commercial market.36
Rooted in sharing with strangers, the sharing economy is increasingly
popular and threatens to displace traditional industries.37 Since 2014,
Uber, one of the most popular “ridesharing”38 services, has represented
52% of all ground transportation transactions and has had a 254% market
growth rate.39 Yellow taxi cabs now represent only 11% of recorded
ground transportation transactions.40 Similarly, Airbnb, one of the most
popular “home sharing” services,41 advertises nearly five million listings
spanning 191 countries, surpassing the number of listed rooms of the top
36. Juan Martinez, Uber and Airbnb Are Revolutionizing Business Travel,
ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/288346
[https://perma.cc/G5RC-ZFAU].
37. Melanie DeFiore, Where Techs Rush in, Courts Should Fear to Tread:
How Courts Should Respond to the Changing Economics of Today, 38 CARDOZO
L. REV. 761, 775 (2016).
38. What Is Ridesharing?, GOODWILL COMMUNITY FOUND. GLOBAL, https://
edu.gcfglobal.org/en/sharingeconomy/what-is-ridesharing/1/ [https://perma.cc/F
8SR-YKR6] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018). The term “ridesharing” refers to a service
in the sharing economy that arranges one-way transportation through smartphone
applications like Uber and Lyft. Id.
39. Martinez, supra note 36.
40. Id.
41. Chad Marzen, Darren A. Prum, & Robert J. Aalberts, The New Sharing
Economy: The Role of Property, Tort, and Contract Law for Managing the Airbnb
Model, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 295, 296 (2017). The term “home sharing” refers
to a service in the sharing economy that enables property owners to rent their
homes and apartments to others for a short-term period through technological
platforms like Airbnb, VRBO, and Homeaway. Id.
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five hotel chains combined.42 Demonstrated by their groundbreaking
business models, sharing-economy companies are disrupting established
industries and societal norms by promoting freelance work over full-time
employment and property renting over ownership.43
A. The Sharing Economy: New Business Models for a New Era
Consumers of all generations have embraced the new economic
culture brought about by the boom in technology and the internet.44 The
sharing economy values the renting, swapping, lending, gifting, and
sharing of goods and services, contrary to the previous economy organized
around ownership.45 This shift allows asset owners in the sharing economy
to earn additional income by utilizing digital platforms, such as
smartphone apps, to capitalize on their free time and unused property.46
For instance, homeowners can rent out driveway space to strangers for
parking via Parking Panda.47 Additionally, consumers can save a
significant amount of money by renting from others in the sharing
economy, instead of purchasing goods and services from a traditional
commercial entity.48 Rent the Runway, for example, provides a platform
for women to rent designer dresses for affordable prices.49 These types of
sharing-economy transactions generally implicate three parties: (1) the
consumer or app user; (2) the sharing-economy company; and (3) the
agent, such as the asset owner or individual, who provides the particular
service.50

42. Your Safety Is Our Priority, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/trust
[https://perma.cc/9FUZ-W8UT] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
43. See Horowitz, supra note 14.
44. Inara Scott & Elizabeth Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New
Sharing Economy, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 553, 554 (2017).
45. Id. at 559.
46. Id.
47. Id. See also PARKING PANDA, https://www.parkingpanda.com/how-itworks [https://perma.cc/DXB4-WSN3] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
48. See generally Geron, supra note 1.
49. How Rent the Runway Works, RENT THE RUNWAY, https://www.rentthe
runway.com/how_renting_works?action_type=footer_link [https://perma.cc/6U3
H-E8HX] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018). Rent the Runway provides women the
opportunity to rent high-end, designer dresses and clothing at affordable prices
for short periods of time. Id.
50. Four Models of Sharing Economy Platforms, MGMT. OF INFO. SYSTEMS
Q. EXECUTIVE, http://www.misqe.org/ojs2/index.php/misqe/article/viewFile/798
/474 [https://perma.cc/AM7C-ZGMJ] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
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The sharing economy traces back to companies like eBay and
Craigslist, which continue to enable individual, small-scale sellers to reach
a broad audience and to market goods and services online.51 Today,
companies like Airbnb, VRBO, Homeaway, Uber, Lyft, Care.com, and
Grubhub dominate the industry.52 Airbnb, VRBO, and Homeaway evince
the trend of homeowners sharing their houses, apartments, and
condominiums with others through web-based platforms.53 For
homeowners and tourists alike, home sharing platforms offer new and
unexpected economic advantages. Property owners receive assistance in
paying off their mortgages, while tourists save a significant amount of
money on lodging when traveling.54
Sharing-economy companies differ from typical large corporations or
enterprises that value skill, training, and organization and operate
according to a highly centralized business scheme.55 In the sharing
economy, anyone can become an innkeeper or taxi driver at the tap of a
finger, overturning years of highly centralized and organized commercial
entities.56 The sharing economy operates according to a “peer-to-peer,”
diverse scheme that functions “on the basis of individual trust and on an
ad hoc level.”57 Essentially acting as a broker, the sharing-economy
company facilitates the transaction between the consumer and the asset
owner or individual providing the respective service.58 The degree of
control a sharing-economy company exerts over its agent, however, varies
from company to company.59 Some sharing-economy companies exercise
a significant degree of control over the manner in which their agents
operate, resembling an employment relationship.60 Other sharingeconomy companies exercise minimal control and operate merely as
51. McPeak, supra note 32, at 179.
52. Scott & Brown, supra note 44, at 562−65.
53. Marzen, Prum, & Aalberts, supra note 41, at 296.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Casey Rockwell et al., Legal Ambiguity as a Competitive Advantage:
Airbnb’s Use of Technological Novelty to Avoid Liability, 46 REAL EST. L.J. 356
(2017).
57. McPeak, supra note 32, at 188–89.
58. Michèle Finck & Sofia Ranchordás, Sharing and the City, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1299, 1311 (2016).
59. See Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 3d 767,
769 (E.D. La. 2017); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D.
Cal. 2016); Lawson v. GrubHub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
60. See, e.g., How Uber Works, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about/howdoes-uber-work/ [https://perma.cc/2DPD-REBX] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
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technological platforms that connect agents and consumers.61 The business
models of Airbnb and Uber, the “poster children”62 of the sharing
economy, exemplify the varying degrees of control sharing-economy
companies exert over their agents and the novelty of sharing-economy
companies’ business models.63
1. Airbnb and Airbnb Plus: The Worldwide Home Sharing
Platform
Founded in 2008, Airbnb is a home sharing platform that provides
property owners, or hosts, the opportunity to rent their homes to guests
seeking short-term lodging. 64 Across the world, Airbnb offers a more
affordable and innovative alternative to a hotel room.65 As opposed to a
single hotel room or suite, Airbnb guests can rent entire homes,
apartments, tree houses, Airstreams, and even castles.66 Airbnb connects
hosts and guests in more than 81,000 cities and 191 countries.67 On any
given night, homeowners rent to about two million guests through
Airbnb’s platform.68
To rent through Airbnb, guests first input their intended destinations,
dates, and number of guests.69 Guests may refine the results by filtering a
number of preferences, including the type of home, price, type of trip,
available amenities, number of beds, type of property, and neighborhood.70
When sifting through listings, guests may view photos and read reviews
of both the residences and the Airbnb hosts.71 After selecting and booking
61. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 769; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 782.
62. Alice Armitage, Andrew K. Cordova, & Rebecca Siegel, Design
Thinking: The Answer to the Impasse Between Innovation and Regulation, 2 GEO.
L. TECH. REV. 3 (2017).
63. Id.
64. Marzen, Prum, & Aalberts, supra note 41, at 298.
65. Talia Avakian, Here’s Where It’s Cheaper to Book an Airbnb Over a
Hotel Room, BUS. INSIDER, https://www.businessinsider.com/is-it-cheaper-toairbnb-or-get-a-hotel-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/7ABH-6DTY] (last visited Oct.
13, 2018).
66. Sienna Fantozzi, The Most Unique Airbnbs You Can Rent Right Now,
HOUSE BEAUTIFUL (July 26, 2018) https://www.housebeautiful.com/lifestyle/
g22562433/unique-airbnb-rentals/ [https://perma.cc/UZ6X-GSNW].
67. Your Safety Is Our Priority, supra note 42.
68. Id.
69. See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com [https://perma.cc/Q8NE-X489]
(last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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a residence, Airbnb provides guests with their hosts’ email addresses and
phone numbers, as well as a private messaging system for discussion of
arrangements.72
To become an Airbnb host, property owners first create a personal
profile that lays out the property details.73 Airbnb hosts enjoy a significant
degree of freedom over the manner in which they rent out their properties
through the platform.74 They retain the right to review each booking
request, decline requests, and set their own rental prices.75 Airbnb requires
that hosts meet four requirements: (1) be responsive; (2) accept reservation
requests; (3) avoid canceling reservations; and (4) obtain positive
reviews.76 Failure to adhere to these requirements may result in penalties,
including a cancellation fee, a blocked calendar that prevents reservations
for a period of time, and account suspension.77 Airbnb also recommends
that hosts provide an easy check-in policy, accurate listing details, and
essential amenities, such as toilet paper, soap, linens, towels, and pillows.78
Before permitting potential hosts and guests to utilize its services,
Airbnb conducts limited background checks.79 Airbnb currently checks
public, state, and county criminal records, in addition to state and national
sex offender registries.80 If a background check reveals that a potential host
or guest has a serious criminal history reflecting convictions within a
certain time frame, Airbnb will either deactivate the account or flag the
account for further review.81 Although Airbnb disclaims on its website that
72. Id.
73. Marzen, Prum, & Aalberts, supra note 41, at 298.
74. Hosting in 3 Steps, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host/homes
[https://perma.cc/Z5CU-HE8S] (last visited May 5, 2019).
75. Id.
76. Hosting on Airbnb, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/hospitality
[https://perma.cc/V97Q-GXFR] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
77. What Is the Airbnb Service Fee?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/
article/1857/what-is-the-airbnb-service-fee [https://perma.cc/S7EP-9U8B] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018).
78. Hosting on Airbnb, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/hospitality (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018).
79. Does Airbnb Perform Background Checks on Members?, AIRBNB, https:/
/www.airbnb.com/help/article/1308/does-airbnb-perform-background-checks-on
-members [https://perma.cc/SCQ2-YLK3] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
80. Id.
81. Id. Airbnb considers serious crimes to include “murder, terrorism, rape or
child molestation.” Id. Airbnb may also take adverse action against a potential
host or guest with a record for crimes like felony burglary, felony larceny, fraud,
and property damage. Less serious convictions, such as disorderly conduct and
marijuana possession, generally do not result in deactivation. Id.
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its background checks may be incomplete and that it cannot guarantee user
safety, it is unlikely that such disclaimers would relieve the company of
liability.82 Until the question reaches a court through litigation or is
addressed by state legislatures through a reform of tort law, the
effectiveness of Airbnb’s disclaimers remain unclear.83
Airbnb’s recent launch of “Airbnb Plus” exemplifies the dynamic
nature of sharing-economy companies.84 Airbnb Plus markets homes of
“only the highest quality” with hosts who reflect average ratings of 4.8
stars or higher out of 5 stars.85 An Airbnb partner personally visits all
homes advertised as an Airbnb Plus listing “to ensure comfort,
consistency, and design.”86 Airbnb hosts must pay a one-time $149 fee to
apply to the Airbnb Plus program, and they must have a professional
photographer take photos of the residence.87 Airbnb specifies a number of
requirements to which Airbnb Plus hosts must adhere.88 For instance, a
neutral or pleasant aroma must be present in each room.89 Showerheads
and faucets must not leak, and hosts must display artwork or photographs
reflecting their style and personality around the residence.90 Guests pay a
higher price for the Airbnb Plus service and receive a more luxurious
experience.91
Currently, courts attempt to classify sharing-economy companies
based on their original business models.92 The launch of Airbnb Plus
illustrates, however, that sharing-economy companies constantly adopt
new features and alter their business models.93 Although courts have held
that Airbnb exerts minimal control over its hosts, Airbnb, through its
82. Id.
83. See generally id.
84. See generally Introducing Airbnb Plus, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb
.com/plus [https://perma.cc/SCQ2-YLK3] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. How to Join, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/plus/host [https://perma
.cc/G8CA-QJPF] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Nick Statt, Airbnb Reveals New Hotel-Like Service Called Airbnb Plus,
VERGE (Feb. 22, 2018, 12:29 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/22/17040
684/airbnb-plus-hotels-standard-amenities-service-loyalty-program [https://perm
a.cc/2P3N-NMKX].
92. See Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 3d 767,
769 (E.D. La. 2017); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D.
Cal. 2016); Lawson v. GrubHub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
93. See generally Introducing Airbnb Plus, supra note 84.
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Airbnb Plus program, now undertakes a more direct, hands-on role in the
operation of its services.94 The dynamic nature of sharing-economy
companies like Airbnb suggests the need for a consistent standard that
courts can apply for sharing-economy litigation.95 Uber’s business model
similarly demonstrates the inapplicability of traditional tort theories to
sharing-economy companies.
2. Uber: The 21st Century Taxi
Unlike Airbnb, Uber exerts a significant amount of control over its
drivers.96 Uber, founded in 2009, is a ridesharing platform that utilizes
mobile technology to provide inexpensive taxi-like services to its
customers.97 Uber matches riders with nearby drivers in more than 903
cities and 85 countries.98 By July 2018, Uber had completed more than
five billion rides worldwide and retained more than 75 million global
customers.99
To hail a ride through Uber, users must first download the Uber app
and upload their credit or debit card information.100 Users then input both
their current location and the address of their destination, and Uber
connects them with a nearby driver.101 The app displays a live map for
users to view their driver’s location along with an estimated time of
arrival.102 Before confirming a ride, users can view the driver’s picture,
vehicle details, and rating, as well as confirm the fare price.103 Upon
confirmation, drivers pick up users within minutes and bring them to their
intended destinations.104 Uber automatically charges the payment to each

94. See generally How to Join, supra note 87.
95. See generally Introducing Airbnb Plus, supra note 84.
96. See generally Uber Community Guidelines, UBER, https://www.uber
.com/legal/community-guidelines/us-en/ [https://perma.cc/4UNQ-HHZC] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018).
97. McPeak, supra note 32, at 174.
98. Uber Cities, UBER ESTIMATOR, https://uberestimator.com/cities
[https://perma.cc/M2BT-9F62] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
99. Len Sherman, Is Uber for Everything a Good Thing?, FORBES (Jul. 17,
2018, 10:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2018/07/17/is-uberfor-everything-a-good-thing/#7dc8879510ef [https://perma.cc/8J4F-DGLV].
100. How Uber Works, supra note 60.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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user’s credit card once the driver completes the ride, and users have the
option of later adding a tip or review.105
To become an Uber driver, an individual must meet the minimum age
as specified by his respective city, have at least one year of driving
experience, and clear a background check.106 The background check,
conducted by a third-party company, screens a prospective driver’s Motor
Vehicle Record and public state and county, or parish, criminal records
dating back seven years.107 Uber generally disqualifies prospective drivers
when the background screening reveals major driving violations, a recent
history of driving violations, felony convictions, registered sex offender
status, violent crimes, sexual offenses, and other types of criminal
conduct.108
Once accepted, Uber drivers can log into the Uber app at any time and
provide rides.109 Uber does not impose a certain hour requirement, nor
does it cap the amount of hours a driver can give rides.110 Uber drivers set
their own hours, and Uber sets ride fare prices without drivers’ input.111
Uber pays drivers per ride and earns a profit by deducting a 25%
commission fee from each fare.112 Uber drivers must supply their own
vehicles and insurance.113 Cell phone communication between a driver and

105. Id.
106. Here’s What You Need to Use the Driver App, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/en/us/drive/ [https://perma.cc/8766-Q7PA] (last visited
Oct. 13, 2018). In Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Uber drivers must be at least 21 years
of age. UBER, https://bonjour.uber.com/?state=s4-ZSC3mXjBPcwADUfegVk
P64s0bSXysTpdBih_Oxnc%3D&_csid=fv2Fs0TjoKwOvgG6UBpBrA#_
[https://perma.cc/5DZ 8-8FPP] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
107. What Does the Background Check Look For?, UBER, https://help
.uber.com/driving-and-delivering/article/what-does-the-background-check-lookfor?nodeId=ee210269-89bf-4bd9-87f6-43471300ebf2 [https://perma.cc/T9Y9-M
YGS] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
108. Id. Examples of major driving violations include driving under the
influence and reckless driving. Id.
109. How Driving Works, UBER, https://www.uber.com/en/us/drive/how-itworks/ [https://perma.cc/DZB6-L2SW] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
110. Id.
111. Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
112. Greg Bensinger, Uber Drivers Take Riders the Long Way—At Uber’s
Expense, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2018, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
uber-drivers-take-riders-the-long-wayat-ubers-expense-1534152602 [https://per
ma.cc/E7VH-XDFC].
113. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
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a user strictly occurs through the Uber app, and Uber keeps all contact
information anonymous.114
A driver’s failure to adhere to any of Uber’s requirements may result
in deactivation or termination of the driver’s Uber account.115 Drivers must
maintain high ratings and quality reviews; consistently poor ratings result
in deactivation of a driver’s account.116 Uber, however, offers quality
improvement courses that provide an opportunity for drivers to learn how
to improve their ratings, and completion of a course may allow drivers to
regain access to their Uber accounts.117 Uber drivers must also maintain
low cancellation rates and high acceptance rates for rides.118 In addition,
Uber may penalize drivers for taking roundabout routes to a rider’s
destination.119
Scholars characterize the rise of sharing-economy companies like
Airbnb and Uber as unprecedented, groundbreaking, disruptive, and
legally challenging.120 At the tap of a finger, consumers can access an array
of affordable goods and innovative services.121 As the American economy
shifts toward a primarily digital marketplace and away from valuing
ownership, several commentators assert that the nation is experiencing the
“Industrial Revolution of our time” and have labeled the phenomenon as
the “Sharing Revolution.”122 The Sharing Revolution’s economic and
social disruption, along with its introduction of new legal issues, greatly
resembles the sort of disruption and legal issues that the Industrial
Revolution spurred.123

114. See generally Ride with Confidence, UBER, https://www.uber.com/
ride/safety/ [https://perma.cc/3ULK-DYA5] (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
115. See generally Uber Community Guidelines, supra note 96.
116. See generally id. Uber riders rate their drivers on a scale of one to five
stars, and Uber considers a poor average rating as below 4.6 stars. Id.
117. See generally id.
118. See generally id.
119. Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
120. See DeFiore, supra note 37, at 796.
121. Horowitz, supra note 14.
122. Id. The Sharing Revolution, which commentators have described as the
third Industrial Revolution, is the “21st century smart digital
infrastructure . . . giving rise to a radical new sharing economy that is
transforming the way we manage, power and move economic life.” New
Documentary: The Third Industrial Revolution—A Radical New Sharing
Economy, SHARE THE WORLD’S RESOURCES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.shar
ing.org/information-centre/articles/new-documentary-third-industrial-revolution
-radical-new-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/L8FU-EUMA].
123. Id.

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 358

4/15/20 8:48 AM

2020]

COMMENT

637

B. The Industrial Revolution: Economic and Social Disruption
Demanded Tort Law Refinement
The Industrial Revolution in America resulted in the explosion of
cities, skyscrapers, mass transit, radios, department stores, universities,
music, and museums.124 As America’s agricultural society quickly
embraced industrialization, the nation’s economy and culture completely
transformed.125 Before 1870, 90% of Americans lived in rural areas.126
During the next 50 years, 11 million Americans migrated to cities to take
part in the Industrial Revolution.127 American workers left rural jobs to
work in factories and large-scale industries with the hope of obtaining
better pay and more opportunities.128 Assembly lines facilitated the quick
and efficient production of goods, and mass transit and communication led
to an unprecedented level of interconnectedness.129
The Industrial Revolution posed many new tort liability issues.130 One
of the most notable issues arose from the dangerous working conditions in
factories.131 Factory workers frequently suffered injuries, but employees
had difficulty recovering compensation pursuant to existing tort
theories.132 Before the Industrial Revolution, common law rules of
negligence governed an employee’s action to recover for workplace
injuries.133 Under the common law regime, employers consistently
escaped liability—even if the employee successfully established the
employer’s negligence—by raising one of the following three defenses:
(1) assumption of the risk;134 (2) fellow servant doctrine;135 and

124. DAVID M. KENNEDY & LIZABETH COHEN, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 539–40 (15th ed. 2013).
125. DeFiore, supra note 37, at 767.
126. KENNEDY & COHEN, supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’
Compensation in the United States, 1900–1930, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.
(1996), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5840.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMM8-RPGV].
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Assumption of the risk provided a means for an employer to escape
liability by proving that the employee assumed the risks associated with the
particular employment. Id.
135. Id. The fellow servant doctrine prevented an employee from recovering
if a coworker caused the accident. Id.
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(3) contributory negligence.136 Workers needed tort law to adapt to the
new industrial economy to obtain adequate compensation for injuries,
which ultimately spurred state legislatures to enact workers’ compensation
laws nationwide.137
For both employees and employers, workers’ compensation schemes
provided predictability and clear, uniform means of recovery.138 Industrial
accidents regularly occurred in the workplace, and workers’ compensation
schemes compensated workers efficiently and equitably.139 State
legislatures sought to preserve and encourage innovation and to protect
companies from excessive court judgments that would eventually leave
them bankrupt.140 The workers’ compensation schemes, therefore,
protected employers by providing them with a tort exemption for injuries
covered by the scheme.141
Workers’ compensation, a form of insurance, operates as a
compromise between employers and injured employees.142 State workers’
compensation laws enable an injured employee to obtain compensation for
his injuries arising from negligent work-related acts but bars him from
bringing a tort action against his employer.143 Workers’ compensation
laws provide an exclusive means of recovery in which injured workers file
a compensation claim, and some governing body, depending on the state,
decides whether the workers should receive compensation.144 In the event
that the governing body denies the worker recovery or if the worker
sustained injuries due to intentional tortious conduct, the worker may file
formal legal action directly against his employer and recover outside of
the compensation scheme.145
In the same way the Industrial Revolution marked the transition to
urban life and industrialization, the Sharing Revolution is spearheading
136. Id. Employers escaped liability through the contributory negligence
defense by proving that the employee acted negligently or failed to exercise
reasonable care. Id.
137. Id.
138. Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers’ Compensation, 19 IOWA
ORTHOP. J. 110 (1999).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 2 (1992). The American
Jurisprudence is a comprehensive legal encyclopedia covering over 400 topics of
United States law. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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the transition to a predominantly digital economy.146 The Industrial
Revolution’s economic and social disruption left courts struggling to apply
traditional tort theories to new business models, and state legislatures
resolved the problem by creating workers’ compensation schemes.147 The
Sharing Revolution marks another unprecedented disruption as
sharing-economy companies design their business models to avoid classic
tort liability.148 By assuming the role of a “technology company” that
simply connects buyers and sellers of a service, sharing-economy
companies differ from traditional commercial entities like hotels or taxi
companies, and this difference raises crucial legal questions regarding tort
liability.149 Although tort law has yet to adapt to the economy’s radical
transformation to a digital marketplace, courts nonetheless apply tort
classifications suited for traditional commercial entities.150 Jurisprudence
demonstrates the struggle that courts encounter in adjudicating cases
involving sharing-economy companies because the companies do not fit
the mold of existing classifications, given their unique, complex business
models.151
II. TAP TO PLAY THE CLASSIFICATION GAME: TORT LAW’S INADEQUACY
IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
Litigation poses a significant economic threat to sharing-economy
companies, which generally seek to avoid shouldering the financial
burden.152 Sharing-economy companies are wary of adverse judicial
opinions that could negatively affect their business models, which thus
incentivizes settlements to avoid risk.153 Only a handful of courts have
rendered decisions on a sharing-economy company’s motion for summary
judgment.154 The published decisions on the motions for summary
146. See generally Guyton, supra note 138, at 106–10; Horowitz, supra note 14.
147. See generally Horowitz, supra note 14.
148. See generally AIRBNB, supra note 69; Why Drive with Uber, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/drive [https://perma.cc/BF8U-6CMK] (last visited Oct.
13, 2018); McPeak, supra note 32.
149. See generally Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 787 (N.D.
Cal. 2016).
150. See Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 3d 767
(E.D. La. 2017); see also Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D.
Cal. 2016).
151. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; see also Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; see also Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774. A
motion for summary judgment is a party’s request that the court render a judgment
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judgment demonstrate the difficulty in characterizing sharing-economy
companies under existing tort theories.155
To determine whether to hold traditional commercial entities liable in
tort, courts primarily consider the degree of control the entity exerts over
its agents.156 The degree of control indicates the appropriate tort
classification, such as employee or independent contractor.157 Depending
on the level of control, courts typically impose liability based on the
following tort theories:158 (1) respondeat superior;159 (2) premises
liability;160 (3) negligent selection, training, retainment, or supervision;161
without trial because “no genuine issue of material fact” exists for a fact-finder to
determine. Motion for Summary Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
155. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
156. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
157. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774; Lawson v.
GrubHub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
158. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774; Lawson, 302
F. Supp. 3d 1071.
159. The Restatement of Agency, which summarizes United States law
governing fiduciary relationships between principals and their agents, provides
that employers may be liable for the physical harm that employees cause during
the course and scope of employment pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat
superior. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The
classification of employee turns on the level of control that the principal exerts
over the manner in which the agent performs his work. Id.
160. The Restatement of Torts, which summarizes general principles of United
States tort law, provides that lessors of land may be held liable under certain
circumstances for the harm that entrants sustain on the leased premises.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 53 (AM. LAW INST.
2012). The lessor retains a duty of reasonable care for the portions of the land in
his control. Id. If any dangerous condition exists, the lessor must disclose it to the
lessee if the dangerous condition: (1) presents a risk to entrants; (2) subsists on
the land when the lessee takes possession; (3) is concealed and unrecognized by
the lessee; and (4) is known or should be known to the lessor. Id.
161. The Restatement of Agency provides that third parties may file an action
directly against a principal for negligently “selecting, training, retaining,
supervising, or otherwise controlling” its agent. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.05. A claimant’s ability to prevail turns on whether the principal
knew or should have known about the risk the agent posed and failed to take
measures to protect the consumer. See Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05. Plaintiffs have asserted this
heightened duty of care against sharing-economy companies when seeking to
recover for sexual assault. See Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774. To establish this
heightened duty of care, plaintiffs must establish the following elements: (1) the
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or (4) negligent breach of a duty based on a special relationship.162 Courts,
however, are struggling to determine the appropriate tort classifications
for sharing-economy companies because the companies’ hands-off,
peer-to-peer business models truly do not fit the mold of existing
classifications for traditional centralized business models.163
In attempting to apply existing tort classifications, courts analogize
sharing-economy companies to various commercial relationships.164 The
quest to determine the appropriate classification, however, has led to even
more unpredictability regarding sharing-economy company liability.165
Litigation involving Airbnb and Uber—the “poster children” of the
sharing economy—exemplifies the jurisprudential struggle to apply
traditional tort classifications to sharing-economy companies.166
A. Player One: Carroll v. American Empire Surplus Lines Co.
In limited situations, Louisiana courts impose a heightened standard
of care pursuant to the existence of a special relationship in which the
defendant exerts a significant degree of control over the injured plaintiff
or where “special attributes of trust or confidence” exist between the
parties.167 Louisiana’s theory of custodial liability mandates the custodian
company conducted a background check; (2) the background check showed prior
criminal history as to give the company actual or constructive knowledge of the
risk; and (3) the company failed to take protective measures. See Doe, 184 F.
Supp. 3d 774. In addition to owing a heightened duty of care based on negligent
selection, training, retainment, or supervision, a company may also owe a
heightened duty of care based on holding a special relationship with a consumer.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 40(a).
162. The Restatement of Torts provides that an actor may owe a heightened
duty of reasonable care to another when a special relationship exists with respect
to risks arising in the scope of that relationship. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 40(a). Courts have held that common carrier–passenger
and innkeeper–guest relationships constitute special relationships that give rise to
a heightened duty of reasonable care. Id.
163. Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1067, 1080 (2015).
164. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
165. See Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774; Lawson, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071.
166. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774; Lawson, 302
F. Supp. 3d 1071.
167. Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767. Louisiana courts have found a special
relationship to exist between common carriers and passengers, innkeepers and
guests, employers and injured employees, jailers and prisoners, and teachers and
students. See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589, 597 (La. 2015).

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 363

4/15/20 8:48 AM

642

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

of property to “keep [it] in a reasonably safe condition[, and to] discover
any unreasonably dangerous condition on his premises and either correct
the condition or warn potential victims of its existence.”168 In Carroll v.
American Empire Surplus Lines Co., Andrew Callard and his friends
rented a property in New Orleans through Airbnb.169 During their stay, the
wooden stairs leading to the front door collapsed while Callard was
climbing them. He fell about 10 feet and allegedly suffered severe brain
and musculoskeletal injuries.170 Callard brought negligence171 and
custodial liability172 claims against Airbnb.173 The central issue was
whether Airbnb owed Callard some duty of protection pursuant to a special
or custodial relationship.174
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
dismissed Callard’s negligence claims and held that Airbnb did not owe a
duty to correct the property’s defects and remove the property from the
Airbnb platform.175 Characterizing Airbnb’s role as purely intermediary,
the court found that Airbnb and its guests do not hold a special relationship
that would give rise to a heightened standard of care and held that Airbnb
168. Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 774.
169. Id. at 769.
170. Id.
171. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 governs general negligence claims in
Louisiana. Louisiana courts utilize a duty/risk analysis to determine whether the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 171 So.3d
851, 855 (La. 2014). A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must prove the
following elements:
(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific
standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct
to the appropriate standard of care; (3) the defendant’s substandard
conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; (4) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5)
actual damages.
Id.
172. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317.1 and 2322 govern custodial liability
claims in Louisiana. Louisiana courts hold one who owns or controls a building
liable for harm that the building’s defect causes if the plaintiff can prove the
following elements: “(1) ownership [or control] of the building; (2) the owner
knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin or
defect; (3) the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable
care; (4) the defendant failed to exercise such reasonable care; and (5) causation.”
Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 182–83 (La.
2013).
173. Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 769.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 776.
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does not have a duty to protect guests from harm suffered.176 Even though
Airbnb maintained the right to inspect a host’s property at any time and
remove the property from the listings, the relationship between Airbnb and
its hosts does not implicate the direct control inherent in custodial
relationships that have traditionally given rise to a duty to protect third
parties.177 Throughout the Carroll opinion, the court explored analogies to
an exterminator, a real estate agent, a college university, a facilitator of
internet transactions, a gatekeeper, and a travel agent in reaching its
conclusion that Airbnb does not exert sufficient control over hosts that
would establish a special or custodial relationship.178
1. Round One: Exterminator Versus Real Estate Agent
In determining whether Airbnb owed Callard a duty of protection
pursuant to a special relationship, the Carroll court considered the analogy
of Airbnb to an extermination company in Smith v. Orkin.179 In Smith, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held Orkin Exterminator
Company, Inc., liable when its employee sexually assaulted a customer
during a service call at her home.180 Orkin’s employee had raped female
customers on two prior occasions, and his criminal record reflected a
burglary conviction.181 The Smith court held that Orkin breached its duty
of reasonable care by negligently hiring, supervising, and retaining the
employees it sent into customers’ homes.182 Orkin, the court asserted, was
in the best position to prevent harm to the plaintiff because the company
“actively selected and managed the employee” who sexually assaulted
her.183
Callard argued that Airbnb’s relationship to its hosts was similar to
Orkin’s relationship to its employees because Airbnb managed some
aspects of potential hosts’ and guests’ ability to use the Airbnb platform,
and thus Airbnb owed a duty of reasonable care in hiring, supervising, and
retaining Airbnb hosts.184 Callard noted that Airbnb must affirmatively
accept a potential host before he can list his property, and Airbnb retained

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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Id. at 771.
See id. at 767.
Id. at 772–73.
Smith v. Orkin, 540 So. 2d 363, 364–65 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 366–67.
Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 773.
Id.

4/15/20 8:48 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

644

[Vol. 80

the right to delist the property at will.185 The Carroll court rejected
Callard’s argument, holding that Airbnb is merely an online facilitator of
transactions, in contrast to the employment relationship that existed
between Orkin and its employee.186 The Carroll court found that Airbnb’s
exercise of control did not measure up to the “care and discernment” of a
company hiring an employee.187
The court rejected Callard’s analogy of Airbnb to the extermination
company in Smith and instead analogized Airbnb to a real estate agent
because Airbnb, like real estate agents, merely “connect[s] the parties to a
transaction.”188 The court further noted that both real estate agents and
Airbnb have the ability to accept and terminate property listings at will.189
As Airbnb’s role is similar to a real estate agent, tort law should limit its
scope of duty to that of a real estate agent.190 Louisiana jurisprudence
demonstrates that real estate agents owe a duty to potential buyers to
disclose the known defects in the property but do not have a duty to inspect
the advertised properties.191 The court concluded, therefore, that Airbnb
neither owed a duty to inspect the host’s property nor to inform Callard of
the stairs’ defect, unless Airbnb acquired actual knowledge of the posed
risks.192
2. Round Two: University Versus Facilitator of Internet Transactions
The Carroll court also explored the analogy of Airbnb to Louisiana
State University (LSU) in resolving whether Airbnb maintains a special
relationship with Airbnb guests.193 In Fox v. Board of Supervisors of
Louisiana State University & Agricultural & Mechanical College,194 a
visiting rugby player broke his neck at a rugby tournament that LSU’s
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also Waddles v. LaCour, 950 So. 2d 937, 942 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Osborne v. Ladner, 621 So. 2d 1245, 1257 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1997)) (“[T]he duty to disclose any material defects extends only to those
defects of which the broker or agent is aware.”); Reeves v. Weber, 509 So. 2d
158, 160 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
192. Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 773.
193. Id. at 772.
194. Fox v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 576 So. 2d
978 (La. 1991).
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rugby club hosted on campus.195 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
LSU was not liable because no special relationship giving rise to a duty
existed between LSU and the visiting player, reasoning that LSU “merely
maintained the grounds on which another party staged [a] tournament.”196
Similarly, Airbnb simply supplies an internet platform where hosts
transact with guests for short-term home rentals.197 The Carroll court,
therefore, found that Airbnb does not have a duty to ensure guests’
safety.198
3. Round Three: Gatekeeper Versus Travel Agent
Finally, the Carroll court considered the analogy of Airbnb to a
gatekeeper in deciding whether to hold Airbnb liable pursuant to custodial
liability.199 Callard argued that Airbnb assumed a role akin to a gatekeeper
because Airbnb controls who can access the listed properties.200 To
determine whether to classify an individual or entity as a custodian, the
court looked to “the right of direction and control” the alleged custodian
exercises over the property.201 The court found that Airbnb did not retain
a right of direction and control over the property in question because
Airbnb did not restrict the Airbnb host from allowing others to access the
property during time periods without Airbnb rentals.202 The court further
found that Airbnb retained the right to inspect the property only if an
accident occurred, and Airbnb’s right to inspection was limited to the
damaged property rather than a complete home inspection.203
Additionally, Airbnb did not have the prerogative to alienate the host’s
property, authorize repairs, or enter the property at will.204 The court,
therefore, concluded that Airbnb, unlike a gatekeeper, did not retain a right
of direction and control to impose custodial liability.205
In rejecting Callard’s analogy of Airbnb to a gatekeeper, the court
instead analogized Airbnb to a travel agent.206 Similar to travel agents, who
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
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merely facilitate transactions between hotels and customers, Airbnb
merely facilitates transactions between hosts and guests.207 The court
reasoned that travel agents do not retain custody or control over the hotels
they book for customers, nor do they have a duty to protect customers from
harm caused by the hotels.208 The court concluded, likewise, that Airbnb
does not retain custody or control over hosts’ properties and, accordingly,
does not have a duty to protect guests from defective conditions on rented
premises.209
B. Player Two: Doe v. Uber Technologies
In addition to the Carroll court, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California struggled to apply traditional tort
theories to sharing-economy companies in a consolidated sexual assault
case.210 In Doe, Jane Doe 1 and her friends hailed a ride through the Uber
app in Boston, Massachusetts, from Uber driver Abderrahim Dakiri in
February of 2015.211 After Dakiri drove Doe 1’s friends home, Doe 1 gave
him the address of her intended destination.212 Doe 1 alleged that Dakiri
then deviated from the direct route to her destination by approximately 15
minutes and parked the vehicle in a remote location where he sexually
assaulted her.213 Doe 1 alleged that she then managed to unlock the door
and escape the vehicle.214
In August of 2015, Doe 2 and a friend hailed a ride from a bar to the
friend’s apartment through the Uber app in Charleston, South Carolina,
from Uber driver Patrick Aiello.215 Doe 2 informed her friend that she
believed she left her cell phone at the apartment and would walk the two
blocks home to her own apartment after retrieving it.216 After about five to
ten minutes of searching for her cell phone at her friend’s apartment, Doe 2
walked outside and noticed that Aiello remained outside her friend’s
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Pierre v. Am.–Int’l Travel, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 435, 435–37
(M.D. La. 1989) (holding that a travel agent does not owe a duty to customers to
protect them from negligence of an airline or airport under Louisiana law).
209. Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 775.
210. See id.; see also Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779 (N.D.
Cal. 2016).
211. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 779.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 780.
216. Id.
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apartment.217 Aiello offered to give Doe 2 a ride to her apartment, and
Doe 2 accepted and entered his car, “believing that Aiello was acting in
capacity as an Uber driver.”218 Aiello thereafter began driving in the
opposite direction from her apartment and told Doe 2 that she owed him a
sexual favor.219 He then locked the doors and parked the vehicle in a
remote location where he allegedly raped Doe 2 and threatened to harm
her several times.220 Doe 2 managed to escape the vehicle, and an
oncoming vehicle hit her arm as she attempted to flag for assistance.221
The driver of the oncoming vehicle called 911, and police took her to the
hospital.222 Doe 2 became suicidal and remained in the hospital’s
psychiatric unit for three days after the incident.223
Before approving Dakiri and Aiello to be Uber drivers, Uber
conducted background checks through a third-party company that
obtained background information dating back seven years.224 The
background checks did not reveal any prior convictions, despite Aiello’s
criminal history.225
In October 2015, Doe 1 and Doe 2 filed suit against Uber.226 In January
2016, the victims filed an amended complaint, alleging that Uber was
vicariously liable for battery, assault, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress pursuant to the doctrines of respondeat
superior and the existence of a special relationship between a common
carrier and its passengers.227 The plaintiffs also asserted a direct
negligence claim against Uber for negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention.228 Uber filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended
complaint for failure to state a claim to which relief can be granted per
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).229
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. In 2003, Aiello was arrested for domestic violence and was ultimately
convicted of assault. Because Aiello’s background check dated back only seven
years, it did not capture his 2003 conviction. Id. at 788.
226. Id. at 780.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require the court to determine whether the plaintiff alleged
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The court first considered whether Uber could be held liable pursuant
to respondeat superior.230 California courts may hold employers
vicariously liable under respondeat superior for their employees’ tortious
conduct committed within the course and scope of employment.231 In
answering this question, courts consider the three policy rationales
underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior: “preventing future
injuries, assuring compensation to victims, and spreading the losses
caused by an enterprise equitably.”232 To determine whether an
employment relationship exists, courts also consider the right to control
test, which centers on the amount of control an employer exerts over his
employee, and the Borello factors, which courts use to define employment
status.233
Taking into account the policy rationales, the right to control test, and
the Borello factors, the Doe court found that the plaintiffs alleged
sufficient facts to plausibly establish the existence of an employment
relationship between Uber and its drivers.234 The court also held that the
complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish that Dakiri and Aiello
sexually assaulted the plaintiffs while acting within the scope of
employment.235 Sexual assault by a taxi driver, the court explained, is not
so unforeseeable that customers would expect taxi companies to conduct
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
230. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 784.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 781–82. The Borello factors, articulated in S. G. Borello & Sons,
Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations to define employment status, include
the following:
(1) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; (2) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of
the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (3) the skill required
in the particular occupation; (4) whether the principal or the worker
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work; (5) the length of time for which the services are to be
performed; (6) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job; (7) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
principal; and (8) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relationship of employer–employee.
S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 415
(Cal. 1989).
234. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
235. Id. at 785.
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background checks on drivers to prevent this exact harm.236 The court
therefore denied Uber’s motion to dismiss regarding the respondeat
superior claims.237
The court also considered whether Uber could be held liable pursuant
to the existence of a special relationship between a common carrier and its
passengers.238 The Restatement of Torts defines a common carrier as an
entity that holds itself out to the public to transport goods or persons from
place to place for profit.239 Given that Uber offers its services to the general
public and receives profit in return, the court found that Uber can plausibly
be classified as a common carrier and, accordingly, potentially be held
liable for Dakiri and Aiello’s tortious conduct.240 The court, therefore,
denied Uber’s motion to dismiss the battery, assault, false imprisonment,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.241
The court lastly considered whether to hold Uber directly liable for
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.242 California law provides that
an employer may be held directly liable to third persons “for the
employer’s negligence in hiring, training, supervising, or retaining” an
unfit employee.243 To determine whether the employer acted negligently,
courts consider the employer’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of
the employee’s particular risk at the time of hiring.244 If the harm that
materialized matches the risk that the employee posed, courts will find the
employer liable for breaching the duty of reasonable care.245
With respect to Aiello, Uber conducted a background check in 2015
that dated back seven years before permitting him to drive for the
company, and it did not capture any prior convictions.246 Aiello, however,
received an assault conviction in 2003 for domestic violence, which was
12 years before Uber hired him.247 The court found that Uber should have
known about Aiello’s criminal history and the risk he posed, and it denied
Uber’s motion to dismiss the negligent hiring, supervision, and retention

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
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claim as to Aiello.248 As to Dakiri, the court granted Uber’s motion to
dismiss the negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims because
Dakiri’s background did not reflect a criminal history that revealed a
dangerous proclivity.249 Throughout the Doe opinion, the court explored
classifications of an employee, an independent contractor, a common
carrier, and a technology company to determine whether Uber owed a
protective duty to its customers.250
1. Round One: Employee Versus Independent Contractor
Although the Doe court found that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts
to plausibly establish an employment relationship between Uber and the
drivers, the court emphasized its inability to articulate a definite
classification.251 As the court noted, Uber does not fit squarely into
existing classifications under tort law.252 Balancing the right to control that
Uber exerts over its drivers and the Borello factors, scholars reach
different conclusions as to the proper employment status of Uber
drivers.253
The plaintiffs alleged certain factors supporting a conclusion that Uber
and its drivers maintain an employment relationship and thus should be
vicariously liable under a respondeat superior theory.254 Uber unilaterally
fixes fare prices and does not provide drivers an opportunity to
negotiate.255 If a driver takes a roundabout route to the passenger’s
destination, Uber can modify the fare without driver input.256 If a driver
refuses to accept a ride request when logged into the Uber app, Uber
reserves the right to discipline the driver.257 Uber also exerts control over
various aspects of the manner in which drivers offer rides.258 For example,
the plaintiffs alleged that Uber requires its drivers to play “soft jazz or
248. Id.
249. Id. at 789.
250. Id. at 774.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. McPeak, supra note 32; Katz, supra note 163; Rick Schmitt, The Sharing
Economy: Can the Law Keep Pace with Innovation?, STANFORD LAW. (May 31,
2017), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/the-sharing-economy-canthe-law-keep-pace-with-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/VU3H-DQZS].
254. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 782.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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NPR” or keep the radio off, dress professionally, and pick up the customer
on the side of the street where the customer stands.259
Conversely, the defendants alleged certain factors supporting a
conclusion that courts should classify Uber drivers as independent
contractors.260 Uber drivers operate their own vehicles and supply their
own car insurance.261 Also, Uber does not offer its drivers a salary but
instead pays drivers per ride.262 The court ultimately denied Uber’s motion
to dismiss the claims brought under a respondeat superior theory, noting
its preference to resolve the ambiguity at a later stage in the litigation.263
Similar to the difficulty in distinguishing between an employment or
independent contractor relationship, the Doe court struggled to determine
whether Uber is a common carrier or merely a technology company.264
2. Round Two: Common Carrier Versus Technology Company
Courts may classify Uber as a common carrier because it makes its
services available to the general public and does not prevent any customers
from utilizing its services.265 Because Uber earns profits by charging
customers fixed fees for rides, it qualifies as a common carrier under
California tort law.266 Alternatively, courts can characterize Uber as a
technology company or a “‘broker’ of transportation services.”267 Uber,
through its smartphone app, connects drivers with riders and could be
classified merely as a “provider of technology that allows riders to seek
transportation.”268 Under the technology company or broker approach to
classification, the independent drivers provide the transportation services,
not Uber.269
Despite the plausibility of Uber’s contention that it solely operates as
a broker, the court held that the classification dispute should be “more
appropriately resolved at a later stage of the litigation.”270 The court
allowed the claim to survive the summary judgment stage because Uber’s
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
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business model could lead a reasonable jury to conclude either way.271
Following the court’s ruling on Uber’s motion for summary judgment,
Uber entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs; thus, the court
never reached a decision regarding an appropriate classification.272
C. Game Over: Sharing-Economy Companies Do Not Fit the Mold of
Existing Classifications
Pursuant to Uber’s assertion in Doe that it is merely a digital platform,
sharing-economy companies truly do not belong in any existing
category.273 Sharing-economy companies’ business models are so
unprecedented and complex that present tort law cannot provide an
adequate classification.274 The Carroll and Doe decisions demonstrate the
struggle that courts encounter in attempting to apply existing tort law to
sharing-economy companies and the need for a standard analysis for future
courts to follow.275 Courts’ difficulty in classifying sharing-economy
companies derives from the digital, hands-off aspect of their business
models.276
Consistent with sharing-economy values of furthering innovation and
efficient access to goods and services, sharing-economy companies
constantly adopt new features, indicating that potential tort classifications
may likewise constantly change.277 Airbnb, for example, added the Airbnb
Plus program to provide high-end lodging services. This added feature
already places the Carroll decision into question.278 The Carroll court
hinged its decision on the fact that the minimal level of control Airbnb
exerts over the hosts’ properties or transactions does not give rise to
liability for injuries to guests.279 Airbnb’s launch of Airbnb Plus, however,
may eventually lead courts to find that Airbnb exercises enough control
because of the inspections, requirements, and application process.280
271. Id.
272. Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber Settles Lawsuit over Alleged Sexual Assault by
Drivers, FORTUNE (Nov. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/07/uber-sexualassault-lawsuit-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/A3Q7-HH53].
273. See generally id.
274. McPeak, supra note 32, at 178.
275. See generally Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp.
3d 767 (E.D. La. 2017); Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
276. See generally id.
277. See Introducing Airbnb Plus, supra note 84.
278. See generally Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
279. See Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767.
280. Introducing Airbnb Plus, supra note 84.
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Airbnb may argue that inspecting some homes for the purpose of “ensuring
comfort and quality” may shield it from potential liability because the
inspections are not intended to ensure safe premises.281 Airbnb, however,
exerts a significant amount of control over Airbnb Plus hosts, as it imposes
over 100 requirements to ensure the highest quality homes.282
Furthermore, Airbnb does not invite every applicant whose home it
inspects to join the Airbnb Plus program.283 If an inspector encounters an
unsafe condition in a property, Airbnb could acquire actual or constructive
knowledge of a risk that certainly would lead to liability under general
negligence principles.284 Consider, for instance, if Airbnb had previously
inspected the property at which the Carroll plaintiff lodged in New
Orleans for consideration of Airbnb Plus status but ultimately declined to
extend an invite to the host.285 Certainly, the Airbnb inspector would have
ascended the defective steps, as the Carroll plaintiff did, to access the
inside of the residence and would have thus acquired knowledge of the
dangerous condition.286 Airbnb, then in the best position to prevent the
harm, would be held liable under general negligence principles regardless
of proper classification.
Sharing-economy companies continually evolve and undertake new
ventures. This constant evolution exacerbates the current struggle courts
encounter in applying existing tort law to sharing-economy companies.287
Existing tort law relies on classifications that sharing-economy companies
do not fit.288 Courts cannot continue to employ a “backward-looking
approach” by attempting to extend traditional tort classifications to
sharing-economy companies’ dynamic business models.289 Just as tort law
adapted after the Industrial Revolution, tort law must also adapt to the legal
gaps and uncertainty that the Sharing Revolution presents.290 State
281. See generally id.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
285. See generally Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp.
3d 767 (E.D. La. 2017).
286. See generally id.
287. See generally Introducing Airbnb Plus, supra note 84; Lawson v.
GrubHub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Carroll, 289 F.
Supp. 3d 767; Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
288. See generally Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
289. Schmitt, supra note 253.
290. See generally Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774;
McPeak, supra note 32.
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legislatures should promptly resolve the ambiguity, and insurance presents
a practical, effective solution.291
III. MANDATE INSURANCE PROGRAMS
Because tort law involving sharing-economy actors remains
underdeveloped and unpredictable, sharing-economy companies fear
potential exposure to large damage judgments.292 Many sharing-economy
companies, including Airbnb and Uber, have created free, private
insurance programs to compensate consumers for harm sustained during
use of the company’s services.293 Insurance presented the most practical
solution to the difficulties arising from the Industrial Revolution’s
economic and social disruption, and state legislatures should likewise
adopt an insurance-based solution in resolving the questions of tort
liability in the sharing economy.294 Airbnb and Uber’s respective
insurance programs serve as models for legislatures to consider when
enacting legislation that mandates the creation of insurance programs for
sharing-economy companies, as each of their programs balance the
interests of both the company and the consumer.295
Airbnb provides free coverage to Airbnb hosts under two programs.
Under the Host Protection Insurance program, Airbnb insures hosts up to
$1 million to protect against third-party claims of personal injury or
property damage.296 The program explicitly excludes coverage for injuries
and property damage that an Airbnb host intentionally causes.297 Airbnb
limits this coverage, however, to $1 million per location and an aggregate
of $10 million per year.298 Under the Host Guarantee program, Airbnb
insures hosts up to $1 million for property damage that guests cause during
their stays at each residence.299
291. See generally Spieler, supra note 34.
292. Sterling A. McMahan, Moving to Dismiss: Ridesharing and Assaults, and
the Emerging Legal Frontier, TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 11 (2018).
293. See Host Protection Insurance, supra note 30; Auto Insurance to Help
Protect You, supra note 30.
294. Schmitt, supra note 253.
295. See id.
296. Host Protection Insurance, supra note 30.
297. Id.
298. Ashley M. Peterson, Sharing Space to Counteract the Impact on LongTerm Rental Availability Various Jurisdictions Are Restricting the Ability of
Homeowners and Tenants to Offer Short-Term Vacation Rentals, 39 L.A. LAW.
28, 30 (2017).
299. See Airbnb’s Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/guaran
tee [https://perma.cc/T8VB-TWQ9] (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
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Uber similarly offers coverage to Uber drivers under the DriverPartner Insurance program.300 The first policy covers Uber drivers while
they have the Uber app activated but are waiting for a user to request a
ride.301 Under this policy, Uber covers drivers for the injuries they cause
to a third party up to $50,000 per person or $100,000 per accident for
bodily injury.302 The second policy covers Uber drivers when they have
accepted a ride request and applies both during an Uber trip and when the
driver is on the way to pick up the rider.303 Under this policy, Uber
provides third-party liability coverage, uninsured or underinsured motorist
bodily injury coverage, and contingent collision and comprehensive
coverage.304 When an Uber driver causes an accident, Uber’s coverage
provides, at most, $1 million per accident.305 Like Airbnb’s policy, Uber
compensates drivers for property damage and explicitly excludes insuring
against harm that an Uber driver intentionally inflicts.306
These insurance programs balance the interests of sharing-economy
companies, agents, and consumers, and they further the underlying
policies of tort law—compensation and deterrence.307 By providing
definite and efficient compensation to injured agents and consumers,
sharing-economy companies can avoid litigation expenses and the
possibility of excessive court judgments.308 Sharing-economy companies,
in turn, take greater safety measures to reduce the number of injured agents
and consumers they must compensate.309 Insurance programs present a
functional solution, but the current programs do not fully resolve the
questions of tort liability in the sharing economy.310
An agent or consumer with a meritorious claim may not recover for
sustained injuries depending on the company used or the type of act that
300. See Auto Insurance to Help Protect You, supra note 30.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See generally Host Protection Insurance, supra note 30; Auto Insurance
to Help Protect You, supra note 30.
308. See infra Section I.B.
309. See generally Tom Krisher, Uber to Up Its Background Checks for
Drivers in the U.S., ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 12, 2018), available at
https://www.ctvnews.ca/autos/uber-to-up-its-background-checks-for-drivers-inthe-u-s-1.3881824 [https: //perma.cc/F4G3-CZSA].
310. See generally Host Protection Insurance, supra note 30; Auto Insurance
to Help Protect You, supra note 30.
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caused the injuries.311 Only some sharing-economy companies have
implemented insurance programs.312 If an agent or consumer is injured
after using the services of a company without an insurance program, he
must resort to filing a lawsuit for compensation.313 As demonstrated by
Carroll and Doe, however, courts are uncertain about tort law’s
application to sharing-economy companies.314 Agents and consumers who
utilize the services of a company without an insurance program may face
consequential barriers to receiving compensation.315
In addition, the insurance programs that Airbnb and Uber have
implemented contain significant gaps in coverage.316 The insurance
programs generally compensate for injuries resulting from negligent acts,
such as accidental bodily injury or property damage, but do not cover
injuries resulting from intentional acts, such as sexual assault.317
Therefore, agents and consumers who sustain injuries from intentional acts
must file a lawsuit to obtain compensation, but the unpredictability of
lawsuits against sharing-economy companies presents considerable
hurdles to recovery.318 Courts need clear, definite, and predictable tort law
to adjudicate these claims so that sharing-economy companies, agents, and
consumers can receive just outcomes.319 State legislatures are generally
charged with articulating their respective state’s tort law and, accordingly,
must reform the law to provide clarity.
A. State Legislation Mandating Insurance Programs
State legislatures should mandate that all sharing-economy companies
implement free, private insurance programs to establish uniformity within
the sharing economy.320 The existing insurance programs, such as those
implemented by Airbnb and Uber, serve the interests of the companies,
311. See generally Sharing Economy, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS,
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_sharing_economy.htm [https://perma.cc/
LHQ7-QXSL] (last updated Jan. 1, 2020).
312. See generally id.
313. See generally id.
314. See generally Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp.
3d 767 (E.D. La. 2017); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D. Cal.
2016).
315. See generally Sharing Economy, supra note 311.
316. See generally Host Protection Insurance, supra note 30; Auto Insurance
to Help Protect You, supra note 30.
317. See generally id.
318. See generally Carroll, 289 F. Supp. 3d 767; Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 774.
319. See generally id.
320. See generally Spieler, supra note 34, at 920.
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agents, and consumers by providing efficient and certain relief for harm,
as well as shielding the companies from potentially excessive tort
judgments.321 Airbnb and Uber’s insurance programs insure their agents
against third-party claims for personal injury or property damage and also
compensate for accidental damage to an agent’s person or property.322
State legislatures should specify that the insurance programs cover harms
resulting from negligent acts, similar to Airbnb and Uber’s programs.323
State legislatures should also provide a direct right of action for harms
resulting from intentional acts.324 In devising this mandate, state
legislatures should expressly permit an injured party to proceed directly
against the sharing-economy company and the agent or consumer,
depending on whether an agent intentionally harmed a consumer or vice
versa.325 For public policy reasons, most insurance policies expressly
exclude coverage when the underlying tort is intentional in nature.326 If
sharing-economy companies’ insurance policies covered intentional acts,
they may offer a perverse incentive for tortfeasors to commit harm because
of the assurance that the insurance policies will cover their wrongdoing.327
Consider the following hypothetical for an application of the direct
right of action for intentional harms. In a common carrier scenario, a
passenger injured from the intentional act of a driver may recover by
proceeding directly against both the driver and the company.328 If, for
instance, the driver sexually assaulted the passenger, the passenger can
allege claims against the driver for battery and the company for negligent
hiring.329 Courts will then hold the company to a heightened standard of
care pursuant to the existence of a special relationship, in which the
company has the duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
rather than just a mere obligation not to create harm.330 Similarly, an
321. See generally id.
322. See generally Host Protection Insurance, supra note 30; Auto Insurance
to Help Protect You, supra note 30.
323. See generally id.
324. See generally id. For example, if an Uber driver sexually assaults a
passenger, the passenger has a direct right of action against Uber for negligent
selection, hiring, retainment, and supervision. See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
325. See generally McPeak, supra note 32.
326. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
327. See generally id.
328. See generally id.
329. See generally id.
330. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §
40 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
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injured consumer will have the opportunity to proceed directly against the
agent, or vice versa, who directly caused the harm for battery, for
example.331 It is unclear, however, what the standard of care for a sharing
economy will be.332
B. State Tort Reform Imposing a Heightened Standard of Care for
Intentional Acts
In addition to providing a direct right of action for harms resulting
from intentional acts, state legislatures must resolve the uncertainty
regarding the legal classification of sharing-economy companies.333
Without articulating the standard of care for sharing-economy companies,
courts may find that, in cases resulting from an intentional act, the
company merely had a duty not to create harm.334 Sharing-economy
companies, however, should be held to a heightened standard of care such
that if a company has knowledge of an agent or consumer’s propensity for
violence but fails to take action, the court will hold the company liable.335
State legislatures should hold sharing-economy companies to a
heightened standard of care pursuant to a special relationship with the
agent or consumer, similar to that of common carriers and innkeepers.336
The types of special relationships articulated in states’ tort laws center
around trust, which is the exact foundation of the sharing economy.337
Special relationships like those that exist between a common carrier and
his passengers or an innkeeper and his guests are fundamentally similar to
the relationship between Uber and its passengers or Airbnb and its
guests.338 State legislatures, therefore, should expressly establish that the
relationship between a sharing-economy company and an agent or
consumer qualifies as a special relationship giving rise to a heightened
standard of care.339
These insurance programs will ultimately protect injured consumers,
such as the Sharp family and Callard in Carroll, who may not be able to
obtain adequate compensation from the VRBO or Airbnb host without
stifling innovation or subjecting sharing-economy companies to excessive
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
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legal judgments.340 Sharing-economy companies often sit in the best
position to prevent injury to consumers.341 For instance, when Airbnb
inspects homes for acceptance into the Airbnb Plus program, Airbnb
inspectors may be put on notice of a home’s dangerous conditions, defects,
and risks.342 Uber, similarly, acquires knowledge of a driver’s risks and
dangerous inclinations by conducting background checks.343 Whether
home sharing companies begin inspecting homes or ride-sharing
companies begin to conduct more extensive and thorough background
checks, compensation schemes will deter sharing-economy companies
from failing to take sufficient measures to ensure safety for consumers.344
CONCLUSION
The Sharing Revolution is changing the present economy in an
unprecedented and innovative fashion, similar to the Industrial
Revolution. The few courts that have adjudicated tort claims against
sharing-economy companies have struggled to reach definite conclusions
as to these companies’ appropriate tort classifications, which in turn leaves
liability questions unanswered.345 Present tort law is proving inadequate to
clearly define the limits of liability with respect to sharing-economy
companies, and the dynamic nature of sharing-economy companies
indicates the need for a uniform, predictable standard of liability.346 State
legislatures should respond to the problem by mandating insurance
programs that balance the interests of both consumers and sharingeconomy companies.347 By creating a scheme that adequately compensates
an injured agent or consumer and holds companies to a heightened
standard of care, legislation will further the underlying tort policies of
compensation and deterrence while continuing to promote innovation and
340. See generally id.
341. See generally id.
342. See generally Introducing Airbnb Plus, supra note 84.
343. See generally What Does the Background Check Include?, UBER, https://
help.uber.com/partners/article/what-does-the-background-check-include?nodeId
=6970e704-95ac-4ed3-9355-e779a86db366 [https://perma.cc/T9Y9-MYGS] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018).
344. See generally Guyton, supra note 138, at 109.
345. See Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 3d 767,
769 (E.D. La. 2017); see also Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782
(N.D. Cal. 2016).
346. See generally Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp.
3d 767, 769 (E.D. La. 2017); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782
(N.D. Cal. 2016); McPeak, supra note 32.
347. See generally McPeak, supra note 32.
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the sharing economy’s economic development.348 Legislation will ensure
clarity and predictability for courts to adjudicate tort claims against
sharing-economy companies without needing to engage in a classification
game.349

348. See generally id.
349. See generally id.
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